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Abstract 
We analyze how an entry regulation that imposes a mandatory educational standard 
affects entry into self-employment and occupational mobility. We exploit the German 
reunification as a natural experiment and identify regulatory effects by comparing 
differences between regulated occupations and unregulated occupations in East 
Germany with the corresponding differences in West Germany after reunification. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that entry regulation reduces entry into self-
employment and occupational mobility after reunification more in regulated 
occupations in East Germany than in West Germany. Our findings are relevant for 
transition or emerging economies as well as for mature market economies requiring 
large structural changes after unforeseen economic shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms face entry regulation in many countries and industries, and in various forms. New 
firms must often bear multiple and sizable administrative costs before they can operate 
legally. Other forms of entry restrictions are geographical entry restrictions, for example 
commercial zoning regulation, or educational standards that are mandatory for individuals 
who want to start new firms. Entry regulation can have effects on entry decisions, 
competition, factor reallocation, employment, innovation and economic growth and it can 
lead to inefficiencies. Despite a broad theoretical literature on this,
1
 there has been little 
evidence using micro-data. 
In this paper we make two contributions to advance the empirical body of the literature on 
entry regulation. First, we provide empirical evidence on the causal link between entry 
regulation and individuals’ decisions to start new businesses after 1989, exploiting the 
German reunification as a natural experiment. Second, we investigate how entry regulation 
affects occupational mobility after 1989. 
The entry regulation under scrutiny here is that imposed by the German Trade and Crafts 
Code with its roots in the nineteenth century. The West German version of the law was 
extended to East Germany in July 1990.
2
 The law requires that individuals who want to start a 
legally independent firm in one of the regulated markets fulfil a mandatory educational 
standard; that is, a master certificate in a relevant occupation is needed.
3
 Acquiring a master 
certificate requires several years of basic vocational training, collecting work experience and 
passing several examinations; in addition there are direct costs like course fees. Accordingly, 
the mandatory educational standard is a substantial restriction to entry in all occupations 
covered by the law. These regulated occupations might not represent a random sample from 
the population of occupations. Systematic, omitted factors could drive both regulation and 
entry into self-employment or occupational mobility. 
To identify the effects of entry regulation on entry into self-employment and occupational 
mobility after reunification we use the German reunification quasi-experiment. It unified two 
regions that differed considerably with respect to their economic situation. West Germany 

1 See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2006), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Ebell and 
Haefke (2003), Fonseca et al. (2001), Mankiw and Whinston (1986), and Parente and Prescott (1994). 
2 Not only the West German Trade and Crafts Code, but the West German product market regulation more 
generally was quickly extended to East Germany after reunification. There were essentially no region-specific 
modifications allowed for that could be of practical relevance in our context. In addition, labour and financial 
market regulation as well as bankruptcy laws are set at the national level in Germany. This is important to stress 
as Aghion et al. (2008), Fiori et al. (2007) and Griffith et al. (2007) show, for example, interaction effects 
between product market or liberalization reforms and labour market institutions. 
3 See Section 2 for details. 
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represented a mature market economy with relatively stable incumbent industry structures. 
East Germany, instead, started its transition from a planned to a market economy where new 
entrepreneurial activities, firm entry, industry restructuring, factor reallocation and 
occupational mobility were suddenly needed to an unusually high degree. In addition, East 
Germans were restricted in their educational choices under the planned economy system 
before reunification. While being different in these respects, the East German and West 
German economies were subject to the same entry regulation imposed by the German Trade 
and Crafts Code after reunification. As a result, we observe two regions in which the 
regulatory rules vary in the same way across occupations but that differ considerably with 
respect to the economic context the regulation applies to. 
We expect that entry regulation reduces entry into self-employment and occupational 
mobility more in the regulatory context of the East German transition economy after 
reunification than in the context of the mature West German market economy. Relying on this 
argument, we estimate the average effects of the change in the regulatory context by 
comparing the difference between the average outcomes in regulated occupations and 
unregulated occupations in East Germany after reunification with the corresponding 
difference in West Germany. 
Our findings suggest that entry regulation slows down entry into self-employment more in 
regulated occupations in the East German transition context after reunification than in the 
mature West German context. These regulatory effects are stronger among individuals who 
would be expected to be more constrained than others by the imposed entry costs. We also 
show that entry regulation reduces occupational mobility among workers more in the 
regulated occupations in East than in West Germany after reunification. Our explanations for 
this result follow from the finding that entry regulation hampers entry and competition more 
in regulated occupations in East than in West Germany. Overall, our findings are particularly 
relevant for transition or emerging market economies, and for mature market economies 
confronted with sudden, substantial technological change or other unforeseen economic 
shocks that require large structural changes. 
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to a number of 
empirical studies that explore effects of other forms of entry regulation.
4
 Bertrand and 
Kramarz (2002), for example, investigate commercial zoning regulation relevant to retailing 
in France since 1974 and implemented via regional zoning boards. They instrument board 

4 Here we focus on empirical analyses that are based on micro data. Studies using more aggregate data are, for 
example, covered by Djankov (2008) or Schiantarelli (2008). 
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approval measures using the regional distribution of electoral votes across political parties and 
find that more intense deterrence of entry by the boards increases concentration as well as 
prices in the retail sector and reduces retail employment growth.
5
 Klapper et al. (2006) exploit 
variation in the responsiveness of industries to identify effects of country-level entry cost 
measures from Djankov et al. (2002). They report that higher entry costs in a country lowers 
the entry of limited-liability firms, increases the average size of these entrants and slows 
down their average labour productivity growth more in industries with naturally high entry 
than in others.
6
 Kaplan, Piedra and Seira (2007) and Bruhn (2008) study a recent policy 
reform in Mexico that has simplified business registration differentially across municipalities 
and time since 2002. They report that the reform increased the number of registered 
businesses and provide explanations for this result. 
Second, there is also a literature on how other forms of product market regulation and 
liberalization reforms affect industry dynamics and labor market outcomes. Bertrand et al. 
(2007) argue that the French banking deregulation of 1985 decreased barriers to entry into the 
non-financial sector of the economy. Most important in our context, they report positive 
effects of this country-level shock on the reallocation of assets and jobs at the industry level, 
with effects arising mainly at the extensive margin via the entry and exit of firms. Aghion et 
al. (2009) report that policy reforms, which liberalized product markets and reduced entry 
costs in the European Union and the United Kingdom, led to more greenfield foreign firm 
entry in the United Kingdom between 1986 and 1992. Kugler and Sauer (2005) investigate 
the returns to occupational licensing.
7
 Using specific features of the re-licensing requirement 
which the Israel Ministry of Health imposed on Soviet immigrant physicians to identify the 
effects, they find that occupational licensing leads to excess wages and negative selection for 
license status. Eslava et al. (2009) focus on labour and capital adjustments in response to 
factor and product market reforms in an emerging country, namely in 1990 in Columbia. 

5 Sadun (2008) follows a similar approach to study the consequences of entry restrictions for large retailers on 
smaller independent stores in the United Kingdom. 
6 Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) provide related evidence. Schaumans 
and Verboven (2008) or Griffith and Harmgart (2008) take a different methodological approach based on the 
entry literature in empirical industrial organization. Schaumans and Verboven (2008) analyze the interaction 
between geographical entry regulation and mark-up regulation in Belgian health care professions. Griffith and 
Harmgart (2008) investigate the effects of planning regulation on entry of large format supermarkets in the 
grocery retail sector in the United Kingdom. 
7 Occupational licensing regulates the entry into an occupation by imposing standards of practice and minimum 
qualification requirements on all individuals working in the occupation (see, for example, Stigler, 1971, and 
Kleiner, 2000). This kind of regulation is different from ours, where individuals can work in an occupation with 
entry regulation without having a master craftsman degree, and even without having a vocational training 
certificate. 
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Interestingly in our context, they find that the effects of the reforms are stronger on labour 
adjustment, especially on the job destruction side, than on capital adjustment. 
While some of these papers investigate effects of entry and other product market 
regulation in mature market economies, some use micro data on transition or emerging 
economies. We contribute, instead, an empirical analysis that relies on the unique German 
reunification quasi-experiment where a mature and a transition economy can be observed at 
the same time under the same regulatory framework. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relevant background on 
entry regulation and German reunification. In section 3, we present the empirical model. A 
brief description of the data and our main variables follows in section 4. We present the 
empirical results in section 5 and the conclusions in section 6. 
 
2. Background Discussion 
After the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), East Germany 
underwent rapid structural changes. Burda and Hunt (2001) document the extent of changes 
between 1989 and 1990: gross domestic product declined by about 30 percent and 
employment by about 35 percent. Joblessness (registered unemployment plus hidden 
unemployment generated by early retirement schemes, involuntary part-time work, and so on) 
increased from officially zero to about 33 percent.
8
 Structural changes were seen to be 
particularly rapid during the first years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and they continued to 
be pronounced during the rest of the 1990s.
9
In Graph 1 we document the evolution of self-employment as a fraction of the 
population in East Germany between 1991 and 2000 using aggregate data of the Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland). The graph also includes the figures 
for West Germany since 1980. In East Germany, self-employment as a fraction of the 
population rose from 2.2 percent in 1991 to 3.6 percent in 2000. Self-employment accounted 
for about 4 percent of the population in West Germany up to the 1990s, during the 1990s this 
figure rose to about 4.6 percent. Overall, the graph documents an impressive catch-up of self-
employment in the region of the former GDR. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that there is systematic heterogeneity in 
the evolution of self-employment across occupations and across regions. The pattern depends, 
in particular, on whether occupations are subject or not subject to the entry restriction of the 

8 For earlier accounts see Akerlof et al. (1991) or Sinn and Sinn (1992). 
9 See, for example, Burda (2006). 
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German Trade and Crafts Code. In Table 1 we use survey data which we describe in greater 
detail in Section 4 to show self-employment as a fraction of employment by survey wave, 
region, entry regulation and the time period of entry into self-employment. Note that our 
survey data includes information on the current employment status of survey participants. For 
self-employed people it also indicates the year they had started that activity. 
The East German survey data for 1991/92 indicates a higher share of self-employment 
in activities that had started after reunification in occupations without entry regulation (4.3 
percent) than in regulated occupations (3.1 percent). In West Germany, a similar pattern is 
seen, but at a lower level: 1.4 percent in unregulated occupations and 0.8 percent in regulated 
ones. Consistent with what we expect for a transition economy relative to a mature market 
economy, newly started self-employment in East Germany is exceptionally high shortly after 
reunification. In the survey data for 1998/99, the fractions of self-employment started after 
1989 in regulated occupations are relatively similar in East and West Germany (4.8 and 4.0 
percent). In unregulated occupations, the East German fraction is nearly twice as high (10.8 
percent) as the West German one (6.0 percent). Overall, Table 1 documents large variations in 
self-employment shares across regions and across occupations with and without entry 
regulation. 
The entry regulation we are looking at follows from the German Trade and Crafts 
Code. The law that was in effect in the Federal Republic of Germany in West Germany before 
reunification was extended to East Germany in July 1990.
10
 The roots of the law go back to 
times long before World War II. In 1897, parts of the historical guild system in Germany 
became institutionalized as a first counter reaction to the introduction of the freedom of trade 
(Gewerbefreiheit) in the German Reich in 1871. In 1908 the master certificate was imposed 
on individuals who wanted to train apprentices in one of the regulated occupations (Kleiner 
Befähigungsnachweis), and its relevance was substantially extended in 1935: the master 
certificate in a regulated occupation then became a mandatory educational standard imposed 
on all individuals wanting to be registered to start a legally independent business in that 
occupation (Großer Befähigungsnachweis). This entry regulation was confirmed in the post-
war version of the West German Trade and Crafts Code of 1953.
11

10 See the Handwerksordnung (HWO) and the Ergänzende Vorschriften zur Handwerksordnung (1953) and its 
minor updates up to the end of the 1990s. See also the Gesetz über die Inkraftsetzung des Gesetzes zur Ordnung 
des Handwerks (Handwerksordnung) der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik (1990) and the Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (1990), Anlage I, Kapitel V, Sachgebiet B, Abschnitt 
III. 
11 See § 1 and § 7 HWO. Exceptions are possible for individuals with skills that are considered to be adequate, 
but such exceptions were rarely granted during the 1990s. Decisions on exceptions are taken by the public 
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The set of occupations to which the law applies covers many occupations that were 
organized as guilds in the Middle Ages and various later additions (Boyer, 1990; 
Deregulierungskommission, 1991). Examples of regulated occupations include carpentry and 
plastering, printing and bookbinding, glassblowing, smiths and locksmith trades, textile 
processing, baker and butcher trades, as well as hairdressing. In contrast, copy and paper 
production, plate glass production, textile refinement, ice-cream production and fishing or 
beautician services do not fall under this regulation. The examples of regulated occupations 
indicate that these are in various fields such as building and interior finishing, printing, glass 
production, metalworking, clothing and textiles, or food and body care. 
The examples also make clear that regulated and unregulated occupations can be 
closely related, such as bakers (regulated) and ice-cream production (unregulated) or 
hairdressing (regulated) and beautician services (unregulated). There is, however, some 
concern that regulated occupations might not represent a random sample from the population 
of occupations. Systematic, omitted factors could drive both regulation and our outcome 
variables, entry into self-employment and occupational mobility. The fact that the entry 
regulation goes back many decades or even centuries, might mitigate the problem. More 
importantly though, we choose an empirical approach to estimate average regulatory effects 
that compares differences between regulated occupations and unregulated occupations in East 
Germany with the corresponding differences in West Germany. Thereby, we allow for 
unobserved effects on our outcome variables that may differ systematically across 
occupations while being constant across regions (see section 3 for details). 
The master craftsman certificate is an educational degree that a person can acquire 
after several stages of training, collecting work experience, and examination. First, the 
individual needs a basic vocational training degree in a relevant occupation; this typically 
involves two or three years of apprenticeship (Lehre und Lehrabschluss). Second, the 
individual needs several years of work in the occupation and a related journeyman degree 
(Gesellenzeit und -brief). This represents the formal requirement for admission to the master 
examination (Meisterprüfung). To prepare for this examination private institutions offer 
courses that take one to three years and can be taken part- or full-time. The master exam has 
both occupation-specific parts and general components; these include, for example, law, 
book-keeping, controlling, marketing and human resource management. A regional 
administration with involvement of the Trade and Crafts Chamber (Handwerkskammer) in charge (§8 HWO, 
Monopolkommission, 1998 and 2001). In addition, there exist some educational degrees that are considered as 
equivalent to the master degree by law, but are similarly time-consuming to acquire (§7 HWO). Non-
incorporated firms can be registered if a fully liable owner holds a relevant master certificate, in case of 
incorporated firms the managing director (Betriebsleiter) has to fulfil the requirement (see § 7 HWO). 
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committee of five members examines the master candidate and the examination is not public. 
Three members of the committee are incumbents holding a master certificate from the same 
occupation as the candidate (and potential entrant). During the 1980s, the candidates in about 
25 percent of all exams failed (Deregulierungskommission, 1991). Altogether, there is 
substantial time investment needed to obtain a master certificate, not only direct costs, like 
course fees, are involved. 
Proponents of the entry regulation in the German Trade and Crafts Code argue that 
regulated markets would work inefficiently or fail without that regulation because of 
information asymmetries and external effects. Among the regulatory benefits they name are 
high quality of produced goods and services including consumer protection
12
 and training 
activities providing skilled workers for other sectors of the economy. The German Monopoly 
Commission and several other German or EU institutions have long criticized this view 
(Deregulierungskommission, 1991; Monopolkommission, 1998 and 2001). At first, they 
argue that many of the goods that are produced in the regulated markets are standard 
experience goods. In addition, reputation effects and private training incentives of firms, 
besides others, should work towards efficient market outcomes regarding product quality and 
training activities. Entry regulation is expected to lead to higher product prices and lower 
production quantities. In addition, entry and industry dynamics, competition, job creation, 
innovation and economic growth in the regulated markets should be lower than they would be 
without that entry regulation. 
After the foundation of the GDR in 1949, the GDR government fostered the creation 
of socialist production companies. Over time their number grew to several thousands. They 
were often involuntary associations of companies that had been private beforehand. As a 
consequence, the number of private companies and self-employed people declined 
tremendously. According to Zimmermann et al. (1985), private companies and self-employed 
people were most likely to be permitted in the GDR whenever the expected gains from letting 
them contribute to meeting the demand for goods and services were higher than the gains 
from socializing these private entities. 
The socialistic government tried, however, to fully integrate all economic activities, 
including those of private companies and self-employed people, into the planned economy 
system. Both direct and indirect sanctions were both used to achieve this goal. Socialist 
production cooperatives were, for example, exempt from taxes and were given priority 

12 In conjunction, it is also argued that entry regulation prevents cut-throat competition that would drive high 
quality producers out of the market. 
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treatment in the assignment of input material. In contrast, private entities were not allowed to 
employ more than 10 employees during the 1980s and had to pay high taxes. In addition, they 
were directly under the control of the local planning authorities who decided not only on 
entry, but also on the allocation of labour, the access to other inputs, the type and amount of 
goods and services produced, delivery times, opening hours and customer service. Altogether, 
it is important to note that those entities that were considered as having a “private” status in 
the former GDR were considerably restricted in their decision making. Thus, they differ 
substantially from private companies or self-employed people in the West German market 
economy. 
In Table 1 we show, among other things, the share of employed individuals in East 
Germany who were self-employed and had entered before reunification, that is, up to 1989. 
For the occupations falling under the entry regulation of the German Trade and Crafts Code 
after reunification the share is 6 percent in the survey data of 1991/92. In the occupations 
without that entry regulation, the corresponding figure is about 1.5 percent. We will return to 
this in Section 5.3 when investigating the robustness of our main empirical findings. 
While the GDR regime effectively regulated the number of private entities in all 
occupations via decisions on trade applications (Gewerbeanmeldung), a master certificate was 
also needed in some occupations (Deregulierungskommission, 1991). This reflects the fact 
that the GDR’s planned economy system formally kept an entry regulation derived from the 
German Trade and Crafts Code before World War II and also kept the relevant educational 
degrees.
13
 Because of these common historical origins, the set of covered occupations is 
similar to the one of the West German Trade and Crafts Code. As all educational degrees 
obtained in the former GDR were acknowledged by the reunification contract, East Germans 
with a master certificate met the formal requirement relevant for running a business in the 
respective regulated occupation immediately after reunification. This is important in the 
context of our empirical analysis; if no East German had fulfilled the entry requirement 
during the first years of reunification we would see even larger effects of the regulation than 
the ones we report in Section 5. 
 

13 See Gesetzesblatt der DDR, Teil I, Nr. 78 (23.12.1957) and Gesetzesblatt der DDR, Teil I, Nr. 9 (20.2.1975). 
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3. Empirical Approach 
To identify the effects of entry regulation on entry into self-employment and 
occupational mobility we exploit a natural experiment which consists of a substantial change 
in the regulatory context. This change arises as a result of German reunification. 
The geographical scope of the West German Trade and Crafts Code that imposes the 
entry regulation under scrutiny here was extended to East Germany in July 1990. In the 
course of the extension neither the elements of the West German Code that regulate firm entry 
nor their interpretation underwent relevant region-specific adaptations. In particular, entry has 
been regulated in the same set of occupations in both German regions after reunification. 
While the same law applies, the economic context differs fundamentally across 
regions. In the years after German reunification, West Germany represented a mature market 
economy. Market structures were relatively stable and firm entry mostly contributed to the 
constantly ongoing process of replacing exiting incumbents and adapting market structures in 
response to regular demand fluctuations or incremental technological change. In addition, the 
pool of West Germans holding the relevant educational degrees to fulfil the entry requirement 
in regulated occupations after reunification consisted of people who decided freely on their 
education. They had the chance to consider information on existing entry regulation when 
making their educational decisions. 
In contrast, East Germany started an unanticipated transition from a planned to a 
market economy after reunification. First, industrial production quickly collapsed and the 
GDR capital stock was found to be largely obsolete. New entrepreneurial activities, firm 
entry, industry restructuring, factor reallocation and occupational mobility were suddenly 
needed to an unusually high degree. Second, the pool of East Germans holding the relevant 
educational degrees to fulfil the entry requirement in regulated occupations after reunification 
was dominated by people who received their degrees during GDR times (see also section 2). 
The GDR’s planned economy system restricted individuals’ training choice in various 
respects.
14
 Besides that, the event of German reunification was unforeseen, as were the 
options for entrepreneurial activity arising after reunification and their regulation. 
Because of these differences, we expect that entry regulation based on the Trade and 
Crafts Code reduces entry into self-employment and occupational mobility more in the 

14 The constitution of the GDR established that everybody had not only the right but also the duty to get a 
vocational degree either through the vocational training system or through technical college. Education was 
considered as one of the means to increase societal equality; children and parents, for example, should not have 
the same occupation. In addition, the central planning system determined the occupations in which in future 
more people should work in and for which young people should therefore be trained. 
regulatory context of the East German transition than in the context of the mature West 
German market economy. The same regulatory rules should be more binding in East than in 
West Germany for the following two reasons: (1) the unexpected economic transition 
necessitates substantial industry and labour dynamics and (2) the pool of people fulfilling the 
entry requirement in regulated occupations depends on decisions taken under the GDR’s 
planned economy system. 
We are interested in the average effects of the shift in the regulatory context on entry 
into self-employment and occupational mobility in the regulated occupations. To estimate 
such an effect we compare the difference between the relevant average outcomes in regulated 
occupations and unregulated occupations in East Germany with the corresponding difference 
in West Germany after reunification. The equation that we run on data from repeated survey 
cross-sections is as follows: 
iorwiwroroiorw uXERERY x GEEEE '3210 .   (1) 
The variable that we want to explain is Y. It is coded one if individual i reports being 
self-employed at the time of the survey and having started that activity after 1989 (or being 
employed in an occupation changed to after 1989), zero otherwise. Entry regulation is 
indicated by R and the East German region by E. Index o refers to occupations, r indexes 
regions, and w indexes survey waves. The error term is u; ȕ0 to ȕ3 and G indicate the 
regression coefficients. The vector X covers a survey-wave indicator and the individual 
characteristics age, gender and education. 
Our main interest is in ȕ3, the coefficient of the interaction between entry regulation R 
and East Germany E. From our previous exposition, it follows that we expect ȕ3 to be 
negative; it reflects the average effect of the change in the regulatory context in the regulated 
occupations. Our approach is similar to a standard difference-in-difference approach in two 
respects (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
15
 We allow for 
additive unobserved effects on outcome Y that may differ systematically across regulated and 
unregulated occupations, though being constant across regions. In addition, we allow for 
additive unobserved region-specific macro shocks on outcome Y that are common to both 
groups of occupations. 
10 
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15 The standard difference-in-difference setting involves comparing two groups before and after a policy change. 
One group is affected by the policy change and the other is not. Assuming parallel time trends in both groups 
and stable composition of each group across time, the difference between the average outcomes in the treated 
group over time minus the corresponding difference in the comparison group identifies the average effect of the 
policy change in the treated group. The average treatment effect on the treated is equivalent to the population 
average treatment effect if individuals’ responses to the policy change are homogeneous or if individuals with 
heterogeneous responses are assigned at random to treatment. 
As systematic variation in the occupational composition of the group of regulated 
occupations or the group of unregulated occupations across regions would influence our 
estimates, we include occupation effects in our preferred specifications. To account also for 
variation across survey waves we let these vary over time. The estimation equation is: 
iorwiwrorowiorw uXEREY x GEEJE '320 .    (2) 
The survey-wave-specific occupation fixed effects are denoted by Ȗow. They account 
for unobserved occupation-specific determinants of Y that can vary over time. When using 
such a specification, the full set of survey wave-specific occupation effects replaces the level 
effect of entry regulation averaged across all regulated occupations [equivalent to ȕ1 in 
equation 1]. 
To estimate these equations we apply the linear probability model despite the discrete 
nature of our dependent variables. There are several reasons for doing so (Wooldridge, 2002). 
First, our main explanatory variables are discrete. In a basic saturated specification with 
dummies for entry regulation and East Germany and their interaction as only explanatory 
variables these three variables determine four mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories; 
the fitted probabilities are simply the average outcomes in the four cells and these cannot fall 
outside the unit interval. Second, in our preferred specifications we include a large vector of 
wave-specific occupation indicators which is not possible in a standard non-linear discrete 
choice model. Third, we are interested in estimating partial effects of the main explanatory 
variables on the response probabilities that are averaged across the distribution of the vector 
of explanatory variables and, therefore, some predicted values that are outside the unit interval 
may be less relevant. In section 5.1, we also compare linear probability estimates with 
average marginal effects computed from non-linear probit estimates following Ai and Norton 
(2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). The comparison indicates that our main findings are 
invariant to the choice of the method. 
In all regressions, observations are weighted to take account of the sampling design 
and to readjust to the structure of the population from which they are sampled (Wooldridge, 
2002). Displayed standard errors allow for correlation between individuals within the same 
occupation. 
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4. Data 
The data for our empirical analysis come from the “Qualification and Career Survey”, 
which is a survey carried out by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training 
(Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, BIBB) and the Research Institute of the Federal 
Employment Service (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung). We use three survey 
waves launched in 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99, each covering about 30,000 employed 
individuals, both men and women. Most important for our purposes are the two survey waves 
carried out after German reunification (1991/92 and 1998/99) as these include information on 
East and West Germany. Data for West Germany from the survey wave before German 
reunification (1985/86) becomes relevant when we investigate the robustness of our main 
findings.
16
In our empirical analysis, we first explore the probability of entry into self-
employment after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The dependent variable in 
this part of our analysis is coded one for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the 
survey and who started that activity after 1989. Then, we investigate the probability of 
occupational mobility after reunification. Here, the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one for individuals who are working in a different 3-digit occupation at the time of 
the survey than the occupation in which they were initially trained, and who report an 
occupational change after 1989. The occupational information in our survey data follows the 
3-digit classification of occupational titles of the Federal Employment Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) in the 1988 version. 
Our main explanatory variables are dummy variables for entry regulation, East 
Germany and their interaction (R, E, and R*E in equations 1 and 2). Entry regulation is coded 
one for occupations with entry regulation and otherwise zero. The encoding is based on 
information in the German Trade and Crafts Code as it was in force during the 1990s and on 
our survey data on the occupation that an individual currently works in. The dummy variable 
for East Germany indicates current residence in East Germany. 
We use the following demographic and educational variables to capture influences of 
individual heterogeneity on decisions regarding entry into self-employment or occupational 
mobility: age in years, gender (coded one for men, zero for women), and three indicator 
variables for education categories. We classify individuals with a degree from a university or 
a technical college as being highly educated. Survey participants reporting a vocational 

16 Please see the data appendix and Spitz-Oener (2006) for further details on the data that we use. 
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training degree either from the dual system of apprenticeship or a vocational school are in the 
medium-education category. The low-education category covers individuals holding neither a 
vocational training degree nor a higher educational degree. Appendix Table A.1 shows 
descriptive statistics of the variables described previously and all others that we use in 
regression analyses. 
Our main sample for the empirical analysis on entry into self-employment includes 
survey participants in 1991/92 and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, work from 10 to 75 
hours per week, have German nationality, and report all the information relevant to us.
17
 We 
exclude the public sector: occupations and industries that were primarily in the public sector 
in Germany during the 1990s (education, postal services, railways, utilities), civil servants, 
and other employees in public administration. We also eliminate employees in non-profit 
organizations (churches, parties, associations) and the mining and quarrying sector. Next, we 
select all individuals working in occupations that are accredited by the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research and the BIBB (Anerkannte Ausbildungsberufe) and covered by the 
dual system of apprenticeship.
18
 This is our population of interest as the German Trade and 
Crafts Code regulates firm entry in some of the accredited occupations, but not in others. 
Accredited occupations account for about 61 percent of the employed individuals in the raw 
data of the survey waves 1991/92 and 1998/99. Entry regulation applies to about 32 percent of 
these. 
Residents of Berlin are excluded as working in one part of Germany, but living in the 
other one, is particularly common in Berlin. We also eliminate migrants who are living in 
East or West Germany and have German nationality but grew up either in a foreign country or 
in the other part of Germany than the one they currently live in. About 65 percent of these 
migrants among the employed individuals in our raw data came to West Germany from East 
Germany or Eastern European transition countries. We prefer to exclude migrants from our 
main sample because their labour supply decisions probably also depend on the economic 
environment in which they grew up, and not only on the one of their current main residence. 
 

17 In addition to the main sample, we introduce several sample variants in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
18 The main characteristic of the German dual system of apprenticeship is that acquisition of human capital 
consists of both on-the-job training in companies and training in schools, thereby providing a combination of 
firm-specific and general skills. See Harhoff and Kane (1997), and references cited therein, for a detailed 
description of the dual system of apprenticeship. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Entry into self-employment after reunification 
In this section, we investigate the effects of entry regulation in the German Trade and 
Crafts Code on entry into self-employment after reunification. Table 2 shows estimates of 
linear probability models for the main sample of employed individuals as described in section 
4. In column 1, we use a model specification with the level terms of the indicators for entry 
regulation and East Germany only, besides the constant and a survey-wave indicator. This 
indicator accounts for any aggregate influence on the outcome variable that is specific to one 
of the survey waves. In column 2, we add the main variable of interest: the interaction 
between entry regulation and East Germany. Then we expand the vector of explanatory 
variables with individual characteristics to account for potential effects of individual 
heterogeneity on self-employment decisions. Finally, in column 4, we also include wave-
specific occupation indicators to capture determinants that are specific to occupations and 
time periods. Examples are factors such as market size or growth. 
For our main variable of interest, the interaction between entry regulation and East 
Germany, we find negative and significant coefficient estimates in columns 2 to 4 of Table 2. 
All estimates indicate a negative average effect of the shift in the regulatory context in 
regulated occupations. Because of entry regulation, the probability of being self-employed in 
an activity started after reunification is between 5.4 and 5.7 percentage points lower for 
employed individuals in regulated occupations in East Germany than for those in West 
Germany. The finding is in line with our expectation that the entry regulation in the German 
Trade and Crafts Code is more binding in East than in West Germany because of the 
unexpected need for substantial industry and labour dynamics during transition and the 
relevance of decisions from GDR times for the pool of people fulfilling the entry requirement 
in regulated occupations after reunification. 
With regard to the level effects of the indicators for entry regulation and East Germany 
the results are as follows. The estimates for the coefficient of East Germany are positive, 
highly significant and economically large in columns 1 to 4 of Table 2: the probability of self-
employment started after reunification is between 4.8 and 7.3 percentage points higher for 
East than for West German employed individuals. This finding coincides with our expectation 
that economic transition in East Germany involves an exceptionally high level of industry and 
labor dynamics. The coefficient estimates for entry regulation in columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 are 
negative and significant at about the 10 percent level. A negative level effect would be 
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consistent with the hypothesis that entry regulation slows down entry into self-employment, 
whereas it could simply reflect unobserved factors that influence self-employment decisions 
in regulated occupations. 
The coefficient estimates for the demographic and educational characteristics in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are in line with our expectations and the findings of related 
literature. We find, for example, a concave relationship between age and the probability of 
self-employment started after reunification and see a higher probability for men than for 
women. Employed individuals with a high education have a higher probability of self-
employment started after reunification than those with a medium education. 
As discussed in Section 3, we prefer to show estimates from a linear probability 
model. As our dependent variable is discrete, however, we also estimate a corresponding non-
linear probit model and calculate average marginal effects for the interaction term of main 
interest (Entry Regulation*East Germany) from these estimates (Ai and Norton, 2003; 
Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004). In the model specification in column 2 of Table 2, the average 
marginal effect based on probit estimates is -0.0538** (standard error: 0.0228). In the 
specification in column 3, the estimate is -0.0608** (standard error: 0.0243).
19
 Overall, 
comparing these average marginal effect estimates with those from the linear probability 
model in Table 2 shows that our main estimation results and conclusions are invariant to the 
choice of the method. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
One concern with our empirical approach is that our regulatory effect estimates could 
be driven by occupation-specific industry and labour dynamics in the mature West German 
economy triggered by reunification. The West German region that we rely upon for 
comparison was hit by a positive demand shock after the opening of the border to the 
collapsing GDR. At that time, the 16 million consumers of the GDR focused strongly on 
products and services of Western quality standards – a demand shock that may have been 
differential across occupations. In particular, it may have driven up entry into self-
employment in regulated occupations in West Germany so that it contributes to the negative 
coefficient on the interaction term between entry regulation and East Germany that we 
observe. 

19 Including the full set of survey-wave-specific occupation controls that we use in the model specification in 
column 4 of Table 2 into a standard non-linear discrete choice model is not feasible. 
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To explore this possibility, we take advantage of the fact that we have an additional 
survey wave that was conducted in West Germany a few years before reunification (in 
1985/86). We estimate a specification that is similar to the one in column 4 of Table 2 but we 
now use an expanded sample that includes observations from the survey wave of 1985/86. 
The West German part of this sample is about 60 percent larger than the West German part of 
our main sample. We redefine the dependent variable so that it now indicates self-
employment started after 1984 in West Germany and after 1989 in East Germany. The results 
are shown in column 1 of Table 3; we again find a negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between entry regulation and East Germany, and a similar size of the 
coefficient. Hence, there is no empirical support for the view that occupation-specific, 
reunification-induced demand changes in West Germany account for the negative average 
effect of the shift in the regulatory context in regulated occupations that we have reported so 
far. 
In East Germany after reunification, there could be heterogeneity in the need for 
restructuring across occupations that impacts our regulatory effect estimates. In particular, 
more expansion or contraction may take place during transition if the size of an East German 
occupation after reunification differs greatly from the size of the corresponding occupation in 
the mature West German economy. To capture potential heterogeneity in the need of 
occupations to restructure, we use employment data from the first survey wave after 
reunification (1991/92) and calculate the deviation of the employment share per occupation in 
the region from the corresponding West German share, divided by the West German share. 
Note that the variable is zero for all observations in West Germany. We include it as an 
additional explanatory variable in our preferred model specification. 
The estimation results are reported in column 2 of Table 3. We see our previous results 
for the interaction between entry regulation and East Germany confirmed.
20
 The coefficient 
estimate for the variable that measures the need for restructuring in East German occupations 
during transition is negative and statistically significant. This indicates a lower probability for 
self-employment started after 1989 in occupations that are larger shortly after reunification 
compared with the relevant West German occupation. 
Another possibility is that our regulatory effect estimates reflect dynamics that are 
related to incumbent self-employment structures. In occupations with many incumbents, 
profit expectations of potential entrants are ceteris paribus likely to be lower than in 

20 We come to similar conclusions if we compare the employment share per occupation in East Germany in 
1991/92 with the corresponding West German share in 1985/86 instead of in 1991/92. The respective estimation 
results are available upon request as are all other results that we discuss elsewhere in Section 5 but do not report. 
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occupations with only a few incumbents. Table 1 indicates, for both survey waves, that East 
Germany has a higher share of self-employment that was started before reunification in 
regulated occupations than in occupations without entry regulation. In West Germany, these 
shares are more similar across the two groups of occupations. Thus, we set out to explore the 
potential relevance of variation in incumbent self-employment across occupations and regions 
for self-employment started after reunification. 
To measure incumbent self-employment, we calculate the occupation- and region-
specific employment share of self-employment started before 1985 as reported in the survey 
wave 1991/92. Then, we interact it with the indicators for East and West Germany, 
respectively, and add both variables to our estimation equation. Most importantly, the results 
in column 3 of Table 3 confirm our previous findings of a negative and significant coefficient 
for the interaction between entry regulation and East Germany.
21
For the additional explanatory variable indicating incumbent West German self-
employment, we find a negative and significant coefficient in line with the expected effect on 
profit expectations of potential entrants that we noted above. The corresponding coefficient 
for incumbent East German self-employment is, in contrast, small and insignificant. This 
result is consistent with the fact that self-employment permitted in the planned economy 
system of the former GDR was of a rather restricted form. Self-employment that was started 
before 1985 in the former GDR and continued until 1991/92 is neither directly comparable to 
incumbent entrepreneurial activity in the West German market economy nor did these self-
employed incumbents adapt quickly after reunification to exert similar effects on profit 
expectations of potential entrants as those in West Germany. 
In a next step, we explore whether our regulatory effect estimates are influenced by 
industry heterogeneity that is not captured by wave-specific occupation effects. Hence, we 
augment our preferred specification from column 4 of Table 2 by allowing for wave-specific 
2-digit industry effects. In addition, there could be variations in the skill structure across 
industries and across regions that impacts our regulatory effect estimates. We calculate the 
industry- and region-specific employment share of highly-educated employed individuals as a 
proxy for the industry skill structure. We use the 1991/92 survey wave for these calculations, 
and we consider the interaction terms of this skill variable with the indicators for East and 
West Germany, respectively, as explanatory variables. 

21 The same result follows from estimating an augmented specification where we include our measure of 
incumbent self-employment directly as a regressor, not interacted with region indicators. Our findings are, for 
example, also robust to using the wave-specific employment share of self-employment started before 1985 or the 
employment share of self-employment started before 1989 as calculated from the 1991/92 data. 
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Again, the estimation result for the interaction term between entry regulation and East 
Germany is very similar to our previously reported results. The coefficient estimates for both 
the additional explanatory variable are positive, they do not differ significantly from each 
other and the one for West Germany is significantly different from zero.
22
In the last column of Table 3, we explore how our regulatory effects change over time 
by allowing the coefficients on our main explanatory variables to vary across survey waves. 
For 1998/99, we find a negative and significant interaction effect between entry regulation 
and East Germany on the probability of self-employment started after reunification. The 
corresponding effect for 1991/92 is also negative but smaller and just fails to pass the 10 
percent significance level. Altogether, we find stronger and more precise effect estimates 
when using data from the survey wave 1998/99 on self-employment that was started during 
the 1990s, than from the 1991/92 data. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our main findings to the following sample 
changes. First, we inspect the sensitivity of our findings when re-estimating the model 
specification from column 4 of Table 2 to include migrants and residents of Berlin. The 
estimation results (Table A.2, column 1) are robust to this change. Second, we use a sample 
without self-employed individuals that started before 1990 and find that these observations do 
not drive our estimation results (Table A.2, column 2). Third, we re-estimate the equation 
explaining entry into self-employment after reunification with a sample where we use all 
occupations, including those that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research and the BIBB (Table A.2, column 3). Results are robust to this sample variation.
23
 
5.3 Self-employment decisions and entry costs 
In this section we explore more directly the link between self-employment decisions 
and the entry costs imposed by the German Trade and Crafts Code. As discussed previously, 
individuals who want to start an independent firm in one of the regulated markets need a 
master certificate in a relevant occupation. Getting a master certificate requires completing a 
basic vocational training of two to three years, collecting work experience for several years, 
acquiring the journeyman degree in the respective occupation, and passing the master 
examination. In addition, there are direct costs like course fees. 

22 Our main finding for the interaction between entry regulation and East Germany remains robust if we use the 
wave-specific share of skilled employed individuals interacted with the indicators for East and West Germany or 
if we use the skill structure measure based on 1991/92 data directly as a regressor, not interacted with region 
indicators. 
23 As an additional robustness check we excluded individual 3-digit occupations and federal states one by one. 
Our main findings are not sensitive to this kind of sample variation.
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To investigate the relevance of these entry costs in greater detail, we explore how our 
main regression results vary across two groups of individuals: employed individuals who 
received their initial training degree in the same 3-digit occupational class as the one they 
currently work in, and those who changed the occupational class at some point after their 
initial training.
24
 Employed individuals who are still in the occupation they were initially 
trained in had ceteris paribus more time to acquire occupation-specific educational degrees 
than the others. As the formal requirements for the master examination are time-consuming to 
be fulfilled, the mandatory educational standard in regulated occupations should constrain 
decisions on self-employment after reunification less among employed individuals who are 
still active in their initial occupation. We expect to see less pronounced regulatory effects for 
these than for those who changed the occupation after receiving their initial training degree. 
Table 4 displays estimates of our preferred model specification from column 4 in 
Table 2 on three different samples. In Column 1, we use the sub-sample of employed 
individuals who are currently in a different occupation than the one they were initially trained 
in; in column 2, we use the sub-sample of employed individuals who are still in their initial 
occupation. In line with our expectations, we find a negative and significant coefficient of 
similar magnitude to the previous one for the interaction between entry regulation and East 
Germany in column 1, and a negative but small and insignificant one in column 2. For 
comparative purposes, column 3 provides the results when replacing the main sample used in 
Table 2 with the sample that we get after applying the additional exclusion restrictions 
relevant to our analysis here (see footnote 24). We see similar results to those in column 4 of 
Table 2. 
Altogether, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that the entry regulation based on the 
German Trade and Crafts Code strengthens the relevance of long-term decisions for the 
formation of the pool of people who fulfil the entry requirement. As a consequence, we see 
strongly binding effects of the regulation during the unexpected economic transition in East 
Germany involving substantial industry and labour restructuring. Similar situations arise 
when industries need to adapt as a result of sudden, drastic technological change, or when 
economies need to restructure after other unforeseen, substantial economic shocks. 
 

24 For this part of the analysis we use information on the 3-digit occupation in which survey participants received 
their first training degree. Consequently we have to impose additional exclusion restrictions on the main sample 
described in section 4: we eliminate all observations where data on the 3-digit occupation of the initial 
occupational training degree are not available, thus excluding all individuals with low education, by definition, 
they never completed a vocational or higher educational training. The reduced sample covers 23,659 individuals. 
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5.4 Occupational mobility after reunification 
In the last part of our analysis, we take a broader view and investigate regulatory 
effects on occupational mobility among workers after reunification. In Table 5, we use 
regression specifications that are similar to those in Table 2 up to the dependent variable. This 
is now a dummy variable equal to one for individuals who are working in a different 3-digit 
occupation at the time of the survey from the occupation in which they were initially trained, 
and who report an occupational change after 1989.
25
As for entry into self-employment, our focus is on the interaction between entry 
regulation and East Germany in the model specifications in columns 2 to 4 of Table 5. As 
discussed before, these specifications come with the methodological advantage of allowing 
for region-constant unobserved differences between the group of regulated occupations and 
the group of unregulated occupations as well as group-constant macroeconomic shocks that 
might differ across regions. Consistent with what we see in the self-employment equations, 
the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are all negative and precisely estimated. This 
is the case in column 2 of Table 5, where we also include the level terms of the indicators for 
entry regulation and East Germany as well as the constant and a survey wave indicator; in 
column 3, where we add individual characteristics, and in column 4, where we also allow for 
occupation-wave fixed effects. The findings indicate that the probability of being employed in 
an occupation changed to after reunification is between 5.7 and 6.9 percentage points lower 
for East than for West German employees in regulated occupations as a result of entry 
regulation. With regard to the level effects of the indicators for entry regulation and East 
Germany the results are as follows. We find positive, highly significant and economically 
large coefficient estimates on East Germany in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5: the effect is 
between 13.2 and 15.6 percentage points higher for East than for West German employees. 
The coefficient estimates on entry regulation are negative and highly significant.
26
Why should entry regulation affect occupational mobility? Also, why should the effect 
be larger in the East German transition economy? In what follows, we provide several 
explanations for this finding. 

25 The regression results that we show are for a sample derived from the main sample by applying two additional 
exclusion restrictions: we eliminate individuals who are either self-employed or for which data on the 3-digit 
occupation of the initial occupational training degree are not available. The reduced sample covers 21,192 
individuals. 
26 Without discussing them in detail, we report the results of robustness checks in columns 4 and 5 of Table A.2 
and in Table A.3. We use the model specifications that correspond to those for the model of entry into self-
employment in Section 5.2. 
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We first have to take into account that the sample of workers includes those who want 
to be self-employed in the long run. This fact can have an impact on mobility decisions for 
workers in the regulated occupations and particularly so in East Germany; they need to stick 
to their occupation if they want to acquire the educational degrees relevant for the mandatory 
educational standard imposed by the German Trade and Crafts Code. Thus, entry regulation 
should ceteris paribus reduce the probability of reacting to short-run opportunities of 
occupational mobility that arise during economic transition in East Germany for those 
workers who expect high returns from starting self-employment in the long run in their 
initially chosen occupation. However, as the group of individuals actively preparing for later 
self-employment is unlikely to represent a large share of all workers, this explanation is 
presumably not the only one. 
The following additional mechanisms may also be at work: Our findings in Sections 
5.1 to 5.3 suggest that entry regulation slows down entry into self-employment more in 
regulated occupations in East than in West Germany, and this is consistent with the view that 
competition is hampered more. 
One consequence of less entry and less competition may be less employment growth 
and job creation (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002). This, in turn, would result in employers 
having a larger pool of potential workers to choose from, longer job queues for scarce jobs 
and more job competition. Consequently, employers in East Germany have a better chance of 
finding workers with occupation-specific training degrees because of the entry regulation, 
which makes it less attractive for workers to switch into a regulated occupation.
27
In addition, entry regulation that slows down entry and competition more in regulated 
occupations in East than in West Germany implies less pressure on firm rents. The existence 
of rents, however, is associated with business practices that firms cannot pursue otherwise. 
Discrimination is one such practice. Becker (1957) argues that discriminatory behaviour is 
costly and therefore difficult for firms to maintain when they are not able to capture rents; a 
theoretical argument that has been supported in empirical studies.
28
 In our context, firms 
might base their discriminatory behaviour on the educational background of workers, that is, 
favor workers with occupation-specific educational degrees. Firms in regulated East German 
occupations might be able to discriminate more as a result of the rent effect of entry 
regulation in line with the pattern of occupational mobility that we observe. 

27 The argument is in line with Okun (1982) who shows that the skill-intensity of production increases when 
employers increase their hiring standard as job queues become lengthier. Thurow (1975) presents a similar result 
for the case where employers’ hiring standards remain unchanged. For an incorporation of these classical studies 
in the more recent literature of matching functions see van Ours and Ridder (1995). 
28 See, for example, Black and Strahan (2001) and Black and Brainerd (2004).
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6. Conclusions 
Entry regulation is widespread across countries and industries, and it arises in various 
forms. Restrictions to entry can have effects on firm entry, competition, factor reallocation, 
employment, innovation, and economic growth and can lead to inefficiencies. In this study, 
we analyze the consequences of an entry regulation imposing a mandatory educational 
standard on individuals’ decisions to start new businesses and on their mobility across 
occupations after German reunification. 
For identification, we rely on the fact that after German reunification, East and West 
Germany – while being subject to the same law – were in very different economic situations. 
We argue that entry regulation should reduce entry into self-employment and occupational 
mobility more in the regulatory context of the East German transition economy than in the 
context of the mature West German market economy. Building on this argument, we estimate 
the average effects of the change in the regulatory context by comparing the difference 
between the average outcomes in regulated occupations and unregulated occupations in East 
Germany after reunification with the corresponding difference in West Germany. 
Our estimation results suggest that entry regulation slows down entry into self-
employment more in regulated occupations in East than in West Germany after reunification. 
The effects are stronger among individuals who should be more constrained than others by the 
imposed entry costs. We also show that entry regulation reduces occupational mobility among 
workers more in regulated occupations in East than in West Germany after reunification. 
Overall, our findings are particularly relevant for transition or emerging market economies, 
and for mature market economies confronted with sudden, substantial technological change or 
other unforeseen economic shocks that require large structural changes. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Graph 1 
Self-employment as a Fraction of the Population 
Note: Data for 1988 and 1995 are not available. 
Source: Own calculations using data of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistische Jahrbücher, all years from 
1981 to 2001). 
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Table 1 
Self-Employment as a Fraction of Employment 
  1991/92 1998/99 
Occupation 
Group 
Type of Self-Employment East  
Germany 
West 
Germany 
East  
Germany 
West  
Germany 
Entry up to 1989 6.01 9.63 4.49 7.40 
Entry after 1989 3.10 0.78 4.81 4.01 
Entry Regulation 
Sum 9.10 10.41 9.30 11.41 
Entry up to 1989 1.47 8.23 1.14 4.30 
Entry after 1989 4.34 1.41 10.81 6.01 
No Entry 
Regulation 
Sum 5.82 9.64 11.95 10.31 
Notes: The table shows self-employment as a fraction of employment by survey wave, region, entry regulation 
and the time period of entry into self-employment. The weighted descriptive statistics are for the raw sample of 
66,236 employed individuals in the survey waves 1991/92 and 1998/99. 
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Table 2 
Entry into Self-employment after Reunification 
Linear Probability Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
Entry into Self-employment after 1989 
East Germany 0.0480*** 
(.0140) 
0.0702*** 
(0.0217) 
0.0676*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0730*** 
(0.0236) 
Entry Regulation -0.0264 
(0.0160) 
-0.0133 
(0.0121) 
-0.0232* 
(0.0131) 
 
Entry Regulation* East Germany  -0.0543** 
(0.0225) 
-0.0546** 
(0.0227) 
-0.0566** 
(0.0248) 
Age   0.0076*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0024) 
Age squared   -0.0001*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00002) 
Male   0.0313*** 
(0.0118) 
0.0371*** 
(0.0091) 
High Education   0.0454** 
(0.0184) 
0.0200 
(0.0128) 
Low Education   0.0024 
(0.0084) 
0.0146* 
(0.0080) 
Constant 0.0682*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0636*** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0866*** 
(0.0272) 
-0.1280** 
(0.0511) 
Survey-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Occupation-wave Effects No No No Yes 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the model explaining entry into self-employment after reunification are 
displayed here. The dependent variable is coded one for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the 
survey and started that activity after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates are for the main sample of 26,661 
individuals from the survey waves 1991/92 and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, work from 10 to 75 hours 
per week, have German nationality, and report all relevant information. Excluded are residents of Berlin, 
migrants, occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB, 
the public sector, employees in non-profit-maximizing organizations and the mining and quarrying sector. 
Robust standard errors allowing for correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in 
parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** denote p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
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Table 3 
Entry into Self-employment after Reunification, Robustness Checks 
Linear Probability Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Entry into Self-employment after… 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
1984 
(West)/ 
1989 (East) 
1989 1989 1989 1989 
East Germany 0.0442** 
(0.0187) 
0.0690*** 
(0.0227) 
0.0502*** 
(0.0160) 
0.0539* 
(0.0326) 
 
Entry Regulation*East Germany -0.0522** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0478** 
(0.0230) 
-0.0559*** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0552** 
(0.0235) 
 
      
Normalized Deviation of the 
Employment Share by 
Occupation and Region from 
West German Share in 
1991/1992 
 -0.0347*** 
(0.0111) 
   
      
Incumbent Self-employment 
Share by Occupation and Region 
in 1991/92 (Entry<1985)*West 
Germany 
  -0.2857* 
(0.1612) 
  
Incumbent Self-employment 
Share*East Germany 
  -0.0050 
(0.1174) 
  
      
Share of Highly Educated by 
Industry and Region in 
1991/92*West Germany 
   0.4595* 
(0.2500) 
 
Share of Highly Educated*East 
Germany 
   0.4758 
(0.4156) 
 
      
East Germany*1991/92     0.0594*** 
(0.0203) 
East Germany*1998/99     0.0856*** 
(0.0284) 
Entry Regulation*East 
Germany*1991/92 
    -0.0354 
(0.0230) 
Entry Regulation*East 
Germany*1998/99 
    -0.0783*** 
(0.0303) 
Individual Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-wave Effects No No No Yes No 
Number of Observations 39,464 26,661 26,661 26,661 26,661 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the model explaining entry into self-employment after reunification are 
displayed here. The dependent variable is coded one for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the 
survey and started that activity after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates in columns 2 to 5 are for the main sample of 
26,661 individuals from the survey waves 1991/92 and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, work from 10 to 75 
hours per week, have German nationality, and report all relevant information. Excluded are residents of Berlin, 
migrants, occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB, 
the public sector, employees in non-profit-maximizing organizations and the mining and quarrying sector. The 
sample in column 1 covers 39,464 individuals as observations from the survey wave 1985/86 are added to the 
main sample. All specifications include the individual characteristics (age, age squared, gender, high education, 
low education) and a constant. In all regressions, the coefficient estimates on these variables are identical in sign 
and similar in size and significance to those reported in column 4 of Table 2. Robust standard errors allowing for 
correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** 
denote p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
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Table 4 
Self-employment Decisions and Entry Costs 
Linear Probability Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
Entry into Self-employment after 1989 
East Germany 0.0751*** 
(0.0274) 
0.0196 
(0.0131) 
0.0736*** 
(0.0263) 
Entry Regulation*East Germany -0.0602** 
(0.0302) 
-0.0110 
(0.0154) 
-0.0586** 
(0.0277) 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 10,779 12,880 23,659 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the model explaining entry into self-employment after reunification are 
presented here. The dependent variable is coded one for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the 
survey and started that activity after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates in column 3 are based on the main sample 
used in Table 2 (see also section 4) with the additional restriction that individuals without information on the 3-
digit occupation of their initial occupational training degree are excluded (23,659 observations). In column 1, the 
estimates are based on the sub-sample of individuals that changed the occupation after their initial training 
(10,779 observations). In column 2, the estimates are based on the sub-sample of individuals that did not change 
the occupation after their initial training (12,880 observations). All specifications include the individual 
characteristics (age, age squared, gender, high education) and a constant. In all regressions, the coefficient 
estimates on these variables are identical in sign and similar in size and significance to those reported in column 
4 of Table 2, up to the coefficient of high education that is close to zero and insignificant in column 1. Robust 
standard errors allowing for correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in 
parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** denote p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
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Table 5 
Occupational Mobility after Reunification 
Linear Probability Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
Occupational Mobility after 1989 
East Germany 0.1323*** 
(0.0159) 
0.1564*** 
(0.0180) 
0.1552*** 
(0.0172) 
0.1537*** 
(0.0185) 
Entry Regulation -0.0772*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.0629*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.0776*** 
(0.0225) 
 
Entry Regulation* East Germany  -0.0560** 
(0.0269) 
-0.0566** 
(0.0266) 
-0.0692*** 
(0.0262) 
Age   0.0082*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0023) 
Age squared   -0.0001*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.00003) 
Male   0.0363** 
(0.0193) 
0.0192 
(0.0141) 
High Education   0.0576 
(0.0367) 
0.0652* 
(0.0347) 
Constant 0.1531*** 
(0.0187) 
0.1479*** 
(0.0191) 
0.0207 
(0.0473) 
-0.0283 
(0.0430) 
Survey-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Occupation-wave Effects No No No Yes 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the model explaining occupational mobility among workers after 
reunification are presented here. The dependent variable is coded one for individuals who work in a different 3-
digit occupation at the time of the survey than they were initially trained in and report an occupational change 
after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates are for the sample of 21,192 individuals from the survey waves 1991/92 
and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, are not self-employed, work from 10 to 75 hours per week, have 
German nationality, and report all relevant information including the 3-digit occupation of their initial 
occupational training degree. Excluded are residents of Berlin, migrants, occupations that are not accredited by 
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB, the public sector, employees in non-profit-
maximizing organizations and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust standard errors allowing for correlation 
between individuals within the same occupation are reported in parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** denote 
p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
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Appendix 
Data Appendix 
The “Qualification and Career Survey” is carried out by the German Federal Institute 
for Vocational Training and the Research Institute of the Federal Employment Service. It 
includes three cross-sections for the 1980s and 90s: 1985/86, 1991/92 and 1998/99. Each 
survey wave has about 30,000 observations; men and women are covered. 
The sampling frame of the survey is the German population of employed individuals 
aged 16 to 65. The selection of the sample follows a random-route process which is done on 
the household level. The targeted person in the household was personally interviewed; in later 
years of the survey, the interviews were done using a computer-assisted personal interview 
method (CAPI). 
To guarantee the representativeness of the survey data, the data set includes several 
weighting factors. One weighting factor accounts for the fact that the sampling probability in 
random-route processes depends on household size. Another weighting factor allows the 
adjustment of the sample to the population according to the characteristics gender, age, 
occupational status, state and size of the municipality (the reference statistics come mostly 
from the German micro census, a 1 percent random sample of the German population). We 
use both weighting factors in the empirical analysis at hand. 
Our data provides information on the current occupation and the training occupation of 
a survey participant according to the occupational classification (version: 1988) of the 
German Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Statistical Office. Occupations are 
classified into 334 3-digit classes. Our raw data on 66,236 employed individuals in the survey 
waves 1991/92 and 1998/99 covers 328 occupation classes; among these are 195 accredited 
occupations. Our main sample with 26,661 employed individuals covers 183 accredited 
occupations and the German Trade and Crafts Code regulates firm entry into 96 of these. 
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Table Appendix 
 
Appendix Table A1 
Definitions of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean/Share 
(Std. Dev.) 
Entry into Self-employment after 
1989 
Dummy equal to one for individuals who 
report being self-employed with an activity 
started after 1989, otherwise zero. 
0.0489 
Occupational Mobility after 1989 Dummy equal to one for individuals who 
report being employed in a different 3-digit 
occupation as they were initially trained in and 
changed the occupation after 1989, otherwise 
zero. 
0.1150 
Entry Regulation Dummy equal to one for occupations with 
entry regulation according to the German 
Trade and Crafts Code, otherwise zero. 
0.3507 
East Germany Dummy equal to one for residency in East 
Germany, otherwise zero. 
0.2060 
Occupational Change Dummy equal to one for individuals who 
report being employed in a different  3-digit 
occupation as they were initially trained in, 
otherwise zero. 
0.5121 
Age Age of the individual at the survey date. 38.62 (10.27) 
Male Dummy equal to one for males, zero for 
females. 
0.5963 
Low Education Dummy variable equal to one for individuals 
with no vocational training degree, otherwise 
zero. 
0.1015 
Medium Education Dummy variable equal to one for individuals 
with a vocational training degree either through 
the dual system of apprenticeship or through a 
vocational school, otherwise zero. 
0.8438 
High Education Dummy variable equal to one for individuals 
with a degree from a university or a technical 
college, otherwise zero. 
0.0548 
Normalized Deviation of the 
Employment Share by Occupation 
and Region from West German 
Share in 1991/1992 
Deviation of the employment share per 
occupation in region from the corresponding 
West German share in 1991/92, divided by the 
West German share. 
0.0201 (0.3560) 
Incumbent Self-employment Share 
by Occupation and Region in 
1991/92 (Entry<1985) 
Occupation- and region-specific employment 
share of self-employment started before 1985 
as reported in 1991/92.  
0.0678 (0.1214) 
Share of Highly Educated by 
Industry and Region in 1991/92 
Industry- and region-specific employment 
share of employed individuals with a high level 
of education as reported in 1991/92. 
0.0879 (0.0773) 
Notes: Non-weighted descriptive statistics for the main sample of 26,661 individuals from the survey waves 
1991/92 and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, work from 10 to 75 hours per week, have German nationality, 
and report all relevant information are presented here. Excluded are residents of Berlin, migrants, occupations 
that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB, the public sector, 
employees in non-profit-maximizing organizations and the mining and quarrying sector. 
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Appendix Table A2 
Self-employment and Occupational Mobility Started after Reunification, 
Further Robustness Checks 
Linear Probability Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
Entry into Self-employment after 1989 Occupational Mobility 
after 1989 
East Germany 0.0664*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0640*** 
(0.0230) 
0.0556*** 
(0.0163) 
0.1328*** 
(0.0189) 
0.1363*** 
(0.0171) 
Entry Regulation* East Germany -0.0507** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0476** 
(0.0241) 
-0.0392** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0615** 
(0.0247) 
-0.0507** 
(0.0252) 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 29,983 25,172 35,737 23,702 27,929 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the models explaining entry into self-employment (columns 1 to 3) and 
occupational mobility among workers (columns 4 and 5) after reunification are displayed here. The dependent 
variable in columns 1 to 3 is coded one for individuals who are self-employed at the time of the survey and 
started that activity after 1989, otherwise zero. The dependent variable in columns 4 and 5 is coded one for 
individuals who work in a different 3-digit occupation at the time of the survey than they were initially trained in 
and report an occupational change after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates in column 1 are based on the main 
sample used for Table 2 (see also section 4) extended for residents of Berlin and migrants (29,983 observations), 
estimates in column 2 are based on the main sample excluding individuals that are self-employed with an activity 
started before 1990 (25,172 observations), and estimates in column 3 are based on the main sample extended by 
occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB (35,737 
observations). Estimates in column 4 are based on the sample used for Table 5 (see also section 5.4) extended for 
residents of Berlin and migrants (23,702 observations), estimates in column 5 are based on the sample used for 
Table 5 extended by occupations that are not accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and 
the BIBB (27,929 observations). All specifications of the self-employment model include the individual 
characteristics (age, age squared, gender, high education, low education) and a constant. In case of the 
occupational mobility model the same individual characteristics are used up to low education. In the regressions 
in columns 1 to 3 (columns 4 and 5), the coefficient estimates on these variables are identical in sign and similar 
in size and significance to those reported in column 4 of Table 2 (5). Robust standard errors allowing for 
correlation between individuals within the same occupation are reported in parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** 
denote p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table A3 
Occupational Mobility after Reunification, Robustness Checks 
Linear Probability Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent Variable: 
 Occupational Mobility after… 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
1984 
(West)/ 
1989 (East) 
1989 1989 1989 1989 
East Germany 0.0673** 
(0.0293) 
0.1481*** 
(0.0159) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0197) 
0.1092*** 
(0.0278) 
 
Entry Regulation*East Germany -0.0162 
(0.0343) 
-0.0566** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0746*** 
(0.0265) 
-0.0657*** 
(0.0252) 
 
Normalized Deviation of the 
Employment Share by Occupation 
and Region from West German 
Share in 1991/1992 
 -0.0529*** 
(0.0203) 
   
Incumbent Self-employment Share 
by Occupation and Region in 
1991/92 (Entry<1985)*West 
Germany 
  -0.0990 
(0.1478) 
  
Incumbent Self-employment 
Share*East Germany 
  0.2129 
(0.1710) 
  
Share of Highly Educated by 
Industry and Region in 
1991/92*West Germany 
   0.8018*** 
(0.2079) 
 
Share of Highly Educated*East 
Germany 
   0.9367** 
(0.3927) 
 
East Germany*1991/92     0.1143*** 
(0.0192) 
East Germany*1998/99     0.1923*** 
(0.0372) 
Entry Regulation*East 
Germany*1991/92 
    -0.0589** 
(0.0249) 
Entry Regulation*East 
Germany*1998/99 
    -0.0734 
(0.0487) 
Individual Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation-wave Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-wave Effects No No No Yes No 
Number of Observations 29,859 21,192 21,192 21,192 21,192 
Notes: Linear probability estimates of the model explaining occupational mobility among workers after 
reunification are displayed here. The dependent variable is coded one for individuals who work in a different 3-
digit occupation at the time of the survey than they were initially trained in and report an occupational change 
after 1989, otherwise zero. Estimates in columns 2 to 5 are for the sample of 21,192 individuals from the survey 
waves 1991/92 and 1998/99 who are 20 to 59 years old, are not self-employed, work from 10 to 75 hours per 
week, have German nationality, and report all relevant information including the 3-digit occupation of their 
initial occupational training degree. Excluded are residents of Berlin, migrants, occupations that are not 
accredited by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the BIBB, the public sector, employees in 
non-profit-maximizing organizations and the mining and quarrying sector. The sample in column 1 covers 
29,859 individuals as observations from the survey wave 1985/86 are added. All specifications include the 
individual characteristics (age, age squared, gender, high education) and a constant. In all regressions, the 
coefficient estimates on these variables are identical in sign and similar in size and significance to those reported 
in column 4 of Table 5. Robust standard errors allowing for correlation between individuals within the same 
occupation are reported in parentheses. *** denote p<0.01, ** denote p<0.05, * denotes p<0.1. 
 
